This paper provides su¢ cient conditions under which regular payo¤ monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and …rst-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.
underpinning of iterated weak dominance. In the current paper we present results that narrow this knowledge gap.
A number of results deal with deterministic evolutionary selection against strategies that fail to survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). 2 Samuelson and Zhang (1992) (see also Nachbar 1990) show that, starting from any interior initial state, pure strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated by pure strategies vanish asymptotically along the solution trajectory of any (payo¤ ) monotonic dynamic. A dynamic is monotonic if it satis…es the condition that one strategy has a higher growth rate than another strategy if and only if the former strategy earns a higher payo¤ than the latter. Samuelson and Zhang (1992) also establish that mixed strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated by mixed strategies vanish under any aggregate monotonic evolutionary dynamic. This class of dynamics includes the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker 1978) . Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) consider evolutionary dynamics that satisfy convex monotonicity. They …nd that, starting from any interior initial state, pure strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated by mixed strategies vanish asymptotically under any convex monotonic dynamic. Viossat (2015) completes the picture by showing that under concave monotonic dynamics, mixed strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated by pure strategies vanish asymptotically.
3 All of the above classes of dynamics are imitative, meaning that strategies that are currently absent from the population remain absent forever. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2011) show that a large class of evolutionary dynamics that are non-imitative fail to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. For this reason we restrict attention to imitative dynamics when developing our results in this paper.
When it comes to weak dominance, it is well known that in some games some strategies that are eliminated by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) do not vanish under the replicator dynamic and related dynamics (e.g. games G 2 , G 4 , and G 6 below). In other games strategies that do not survive iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies do become extinct under the replicator dynamic (e.g. games G 1 , G 3 , and G 5 below). A few papers establish evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies in particular (important) games, such as Cressman (1996) for the …nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, and Ponti (2000) for the Centipede game. The present paper is motivated by an interest in …nding out whether there are any general characteristics of games that imply that iteratively weakly dominated strategies are eliminated by a large class of evolutionary dynamics. Given the abundance of results on iterated strict dominance, the scarcity of results on iterated weak dominance is intriguing. On a more practical note, games with iteratively weakly dominated strategies occur in many applications, some of which we discuss below.
We focus on a class of regular payo¤ monotonic dynamics. 4 In addition to being payo¤ monotonic such dynamics have the crucial property that if one strategy yields a higher payo¤ than another strategy, then the ratio of the growth-rate di¤erence to the payo¤ di¤erence is bounded away from zero. The replicator dynamic is regular payo¤ monotonic as are all aggregate monotonic and all convex monotonic dynamics. We de…ne three properties on sequences of pure strategies dominated by pure strategies in symmetric two-player games, called (a) monotonicity, (b) pairwise weak dominance, and (c) local strict transitivity. For …nite symmetric two-player games, we show that if a sequence of IEWDS has these three properties, then any regular payo¤ monotonic dynamic, starting from any interior initial state, is guaranteed to asymptotically eliminate all pure strategies that are iteratively weakly dominated by pure strategies in that IEWDS.
To the best of our knowledge we are the …rst to provide general conditions under which imitative dynamics select against strategies that fail to survive IEWDS. 5 Any sequence of iterated elimination of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies has the three key properties. Thus, from the perspective of imitative evolutionary dynamics, the well-established distinction between iterated strict and iterated weak dominance seems less important than the hitherto neglected distinction between di¤erent kinds of iterated weak dominance. We apply our result to a discretised versions of Bertrand duopoly and a …rst-price auction. In these games all strategies except one can be removed by a sequence IEWDS that satis…es our conditions. As the grid is made …ner this strategy converges to the Nash equilibrium of the game with continuous strategy sets. Hence our result guarantees that any regular payo¤ monotonic dynamic selects the Nash equilibrium in these games.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides basic notation and de…nitions. Section 3 contains (3.1) the main result and (3.2) illustration and motivation of the di¤erent components of our su¢ cient condition. Section 4 contains all proofs, including (4.1) a summary, (4.2) proofs of lemmata, and (4.3) proof of the main theorem. Applications are considered in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 4 We thank Bill Sandholm for suggesting this terminology. 5 An earlier version of this paper was included in Bernergård's PhD thesis (Bernergård 2014) . A very limited precursor was also included in the online appendix to Mohlin (2012) . Laraki and Mertikopoulos (2013) introduce the higher-order replicator dynamic and show that it performs one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Marx (1999) de…nes a belief-based adaptive learning process, similar to that of Milgrom and Roberts (1991) , and shows that if it converges then players only put positive probability on strategies that survive IEWDS.
Notation and De…nitions
Let G be a two-player normal-form symmetric game with a …nite pure-strategy set S = f1; :::; mg, strategy-pro…le set S 2 , and a payo¤ function u : S 2 ! R. The mixed strategy set is denoted by , and : 2 ! R is the mixed payo¤ function. For s 2 S; let e s 2 denote the unit vector with 1 in the s-th position.
De…nition 1 A pure strategy s 2 S is weakly dominated if there exists a mixed strategy x 2 such that (x; y) (e s ; y) for all y 2 , and (x; y) > (e s ; y) for some y 2 .
Iterative weak dominance is not well de…ned in the sense that which strategies survive can depend on the order of elimination, and in the sense that there might not be any strategy which survives all iterated eliminations. We will look at speci…c cases of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies where each eliminated strategy is eliminated by a pure strategy:
De…nition 2 An IEWDS for the symmetric two-player game G is a sequence ((
such that for k = 1; : : : ; m 0 ; s k 2 Snfs k 1 ; s k 2 ; : : : ; s 1 g is weakly dominated by d k 2
Snfs k 1 ; s k 2 ; : : : ; s 1 g in the game that is constructed from G by restricting the strategy set to Snfs k 1 ; s k 2 ; : : : ; s 1 g for both players.
It is important to note that according to this de…nition of IEWDS a strategy is removed from both players'strategy set at the same time. This is natural given that we only consider single population dynamics as speci…ed below. We will sometimes write "a sequence of IEWDS" instead of "an IEWDS" to refer to a sequence ((s k ; d k )) m 0 k=1 for linguistic reasons or to emphasize that an IEWDS is a sequence.
Individuals from an in…nite population are randomly matched to play the game G. Each individual is programmed to play one of the m pure strategies. A population state is a point x = (x 1 ; :::; x m ) 2 . The expected payo¤ of an s-strategist, at state x is
The average payo¤ in the population is (x) = P i i (x) x i . Evolution of the fraction of s players is governed by an evolutionary dynamic of the form
where the growth-rate functions g 1 ; : : : ; g m from to R are Lipschitz continuous and satisfy
. By standard arguments the system has a unique solution ( ; x 0 ) : R ! through any
We will assume that dynamics are monotonic, and in addition that there is uniform bound on how small the growth-rate di¤erence can be relative to the payo¤ di¤erence. The reader who is familiar with uniform monotonicity de…ned by Cressman (2003) will recognise this condition as half of the requirements for uniform monotonicity.
De…nition 3 Let sgn denote the sign function. The dynamic de…ned by g 1 ; : : : ; g m is monotonic if sgn(g i (x) g j (x)) = sgn( i (x) j (x)) for all i; j 2 S and all x 2 :
De…nition 4 The dynamic de…ned by g 1 ; : : : ; g m is regular monotonic if there is a positive constant such that
) for all i; j 2 S and all x 2 with i (x) j (x): Equivalently, the dynamic de…ned by g 1 ; : : : ; g m is regular monotonic if it is monotonic and there is a positive constant such that jg i (x) g j (x)j j i (x) j (x)j for all i; j 2 S and all x 2 :
We note that monotonic dynamics are such that strategies grow at the same rate if and only if they yield the same expected payo¤. We will use this property frequently to determine the limiting behavior of ratios of the form x i =x j :
All aggregate monotonic dynamics (Samuelson and Zhang 1992) are evidently regular payo¤ monotonic since if a dynamic is aggregate monotonic, then there is a positive and continuous function such that
j (x)) and we can set = min x2 (x): Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) show that any convex monotonic dynamic can we written as
for a positive and continuous function , a convex and strictly increasing function f , and a real-valued function . So, if i (x) j (x); then by the convexity of f;
where min f = f (min s2S;y2 s (y)) f (min s2S;y2 s (y) 1). Hence there is a positive
for all i; j 2 S and all x 2 with i (x) j (x); and thus convex monotonicity implies regular payo¤ monotonicity.
Result

Properties of IEWDS and Main Result
The following de…nition introduces three properties that a sequence of IEWDS may satisfy
k=1 . De…ne three properties that the IEWDS may satisfy as follows:
(a) Monotonicity: For any k 2 f1; 2; :::; m 0 1g, the strategy d k that eliminates strategy s k in step k is either eliminated in step k + 1, i.e. s k+1 = d k , or is used to eliminate another strategy in step k + 1, i.e. d k+1 = d k .
(b) Pairwise weak dominance: For any k 2 f1; 2; ::
(c) Local strict transitivity: For any k 2 f1; 2; :::; m 0 1g andk 2 fk +1; :::; m 0 g, if sk is the strategy that eliminates s k , i.e. sk = d k , so that dk is the strategy that eliminates the strategy that eliminates
The …rst condition, monotonicity, says that the strategy d k which is used to eliminate strategy s k in step k of elimination is either eliminated or eliminates one more strategy in step k + 1 of elimination. The second condition, pairwise weak dominance, requires that for each step in the given order of elimination, the weakly dominant strategy d k earns strictly more against the strategy s k that it weakly dominates than what the weakly dominated strategy earns against itself, or the weakly dominant strategy d k earns strictly more against itself than what the strategy s k earns against d k . The third condition, local strict transitivity, requires that if d k eliminates s k and dk eliminates d k then either d k earns strictly more than s k against d k or dk earns strictly more than d k against d k .
For any given game G there may be several sequences of IEWDS that satisfy these three properties. Furthermore, which strategies that remain when no more eliminations can be made can depend on the order of elimination. However, there will always be some strategies that survive all such sequences of IEWDS, and the following theorem shows that only those strategies can survive evolution in the long run if the dynamic is regular monotonic.
Theorem 1 Consider a regular payo¤ monotonic dynamic with induced solution mapping (t; x 0 ). Let E S denote the set of all s 2 S for which there exists an IEWDS
k=1 with s = s k for some k = 1; : : : ; m 0 that satis…es (a) monotonicity, (b) pairwise weak dominance, and (c) local strict transitivity. Then lim t!1 s (t; x 0 ) = 0 for all s 2 E and all interior initial states x 0 .
Before proving this theorem we will motivate regular payo¤ monotonicity and the three properties that together constitute our su¢ cient condition. 7 7 There is a literature that has developed conditions for order indepence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, e.g. Marx and Swinkels (1997) . There appears to be no substantial connection between these conditions and our condition.
Motivation of the Jointly Su¢ cient Conditions and of Regular Monotonicity
In this section we motivate our jointly su¢ cient conditions (a) monotonicity, (b) pairwise weak dominance, and (c) local strict transitivity. For each condition we provide an example of a game in which there is a sequence of IEWDS which does not satisfy the condition in question, and we show that some strategies eliminated by that IEWDS are not eliminated by evolution. Moreover, we motivate the restriction to regular monotonic dynamics by presenting a game with a strategy that is eliminated by a sequence of IEWDS satisfying (a)-(c), but which may remain in the population forever if the evolutionary dynamic is non-regular monotonic.
(b) Pairwise Weak Dominance
Consider the following two games:
In both games there is a sequence of IEWDS where strategy 2 eliminates 1 and then strategy 3 eliminates strategy 2. Formally, ((s k ; d k )) 2 k=1 with (s 1 ; d 1 ) = (1; 2) and (s 2 ; d 2 ) = (2; 3). In G 1 this is the only possible order of elimination -the only other IEWDS is the trivial one in which strategy 2 eliminates 1 and the process is then halted. In G 1 any regular payo¤ monotonic evolutionary dynamic, starting from any interior initial state, will asymptotically eliminate strategies 1 and 2. Thus, evolution selects the only pro…le that survives all IEWDS in G 1 . Figure 1a illustrates this for the replicator dynamic. 8 By contrast, Figure 1b illustrates the replicator dynamic in game G 2 . In this game strategy 2 is not always eliminated by evolution, despite not surviving all IEWDS. The set of all states at which strategy 1 is eliminated by evolution constitutes an asymptotically stable 8 All …gures were created using Dynamo software (Sandholm and Dokumaci 2007) .
set (Thomas 1985) , represented by the thick black line segment in Figure 1b .
We note the following property, which the suggested IEWDS satis…es in G 1 but not in G 2 : strategy 2, which eliminates strategy 1, earns strictly more than strategy 1 against strategy 1. Likewise, strategy 3, which eliminates strategy 2, earns strictly more than strategy 2 against strategy 2. Formally, if we consider the IEWDS ((
whereas in G 2 this is not the case.
Next consider the following two games. 
In G 3 ; (s 1 ; d 1 ) = (1; 2) and (s 2 ; d 2 ) = (2; 3) is an IEWDS, and this is the only possible order of elimination. Any regular payo¤ monotonic evolutionary dynamic, starting from any interior initial state, will asymptotically eliminate strategies 1 and 2, as illustrated for the replicator dynamic in Figure 2a . The sequence (1; 2); (2; 3) does not satisfy the
It turns out that strategy 3 is not always asymptotically eliminated by regular payo¤ monotonic evolutionary dynamics. The set of all states at which strategy 1 is eliminated constitutes an asymptotically stable set in game G 4 , as illustrated for the replicator dynamic in Figure 2b . 
(c) Local Strict Transitivity
Above we showed examples of IEWDS with
where strategies which were eliminated by such an IEWDS also were asymptotically eliminated by regular payo¤ monotonic evolutionary dynamics. The following two games demonstrate that this property is not su¢ cient to guarantee selection against strategies that fail to survive IEWDS. In both G 5 and G 6 ; (1; 2); (2; 3) is an IEWDS, and this is the only possible order of elimination. As illustrated in Figure 3 , the replicator dynamic, starting from any interior initial state, will asymptotically eliminate strategies 1 and 2 in G 5 , while in game G 6 strategy 2 is not always eliminated by evolution. In fact, if initially x 1 x 3 then all monotonic dynamics (not necessarily regular monotonic) converge to the state where only strategy 2 remains in the population. 9 The thin diagonal line in Figure 3b represents the 9 Notice that strategies 1 and 3 have the same payo¤ against all strategies s with s 6 = 1; 3: In the Appendix we show that therefore u(1; 3) > u(3; 3) is enough to ensure that, under a monotone dynamic,
set of states at which x 1 =x 3 = 1=2. We note the fact that in G 5 it is the case that since
. This is not the case in game G 6 .
(a) Monotonicity
Above we have studied the properties (b) pairwise weak dominance and (c) local strict transitivity. In games with more than three strategies these two properties are not strong enough for our purposes. To see this consider the game 0
This game is similar to G 6 but we have added a fourth strategy, which is identical to strategy 2, against which all strategies earn 0. In G 7 , (1; 4); (2; 3) is an IEWDS in which strategy 2 is eliminated. Furthermore, both (b) pairwise weak dominance and (c) local strict transitivity are satis…ed by this IEWDS (local strict transitivity is trivially satis…ed since there are no k, andk for which d k = sk ). But, as we show in the Appendix, G 7 is such that all monotonic dynamics converge to states where strategy 1 and 3 are absent, provided that x 1 x 3 initially.
Regular Monotonicity
The following game G 8 has a sequence of IEWDS where strategy 2 eliminates strategy 1, and then strategy 4 eliminates strategy 2 and 3. This sequence of IEWDS satis…es our three properties (a)-(c), and thus all regular monotonic dynamics are such that starting from any interior initial condition x 4 (t) ! 1. An implication of this is that if we start from an interior initial condition x(0) with
; then x 2 (t) must eventually become larger than x 1 (t) because otherwise strategy 4 would never start growing. For dynamics that are monotonic but not regular monotonic this does not necessarily happen because the growth rate di¤erence between strategy 2 and strategy 1 can freeze to 0 too fast as we get closer and closer to x 3 = 1. In the Appendix we give an example of a monotonic dynamic for which x 3 (t) ! 1 starting from some interior initial conditions x(0) with x 1 (0) > x 2 (0) > x 4 (0). We have not performed any complete investigation into the di¤erences in results for regular monotonic dynamics and monotonic dynamics but this example shows that our theorem fails if the extra requirement of regular monotonicity is removed.
Proofs
Example
Before proving Theorem 1 we prove the result for just the game G 5 to convey an idea of how the proof works. For G 5 ; (1; 2); (2; 3) is an IEWDS. Since strategy 2 weakly dominates strategy 1, and since strategy 2 is strictly better than strategy 1 against strategy 2 we can use Lemma 3 below to conclude that either R 1 0 x 2 (t)dt < +1 and x 1 (t)=x 2 (t) converges to a real number r (possibly 0); or R 1 0 x 2 (t)dt = +1 and x 1 (t)=x 2 (t) ! 0. In the …rst case, by the comparison theorem for positive integrals, it follows from R 1 0 x 2 (t)dt < +1 and x 1 (t)=x 2 (t) ! r that R 1 0 x 1 (t)dt < +1: By standard arguments, using the uniform continuity of x i (t); R 1 0 x 1 (t)dt < +1 and R 1 0 x 2 (t)dt < +1 implies x 1 (t) ! 0 and x 2 (t) ! 0: So, in this case x 1 (t) ! 0; and x 2 (t) ! 0 as we wanted to show.
In the second case we can compare the payo¤s for strategy 1 and 3 and, since strategy 3 is strictly better against strategy 2, apply Lemma 3 to conclude that x 1 (t)=x 3 (t) ! 0: After that we can compare the payo¤s for strategy 2 and 3 and, since strategy 3 is strictly better against 3 and only worse against 1, apply Lemma 3 again to conclude that either R 1 0 x 3 (t)dt < +1 and x 2 (t)=x 3 (t) ! r; or R 1 0 x 3 (t)dt = +1 and x 2 (t)=x 3 (t) ! 0: But, R 1 0 x 3 (t)dt < +1 and x 2 (t)=x 3 (t) ! r is not possible because it would violate the comparison theorem for positive integrals since R 1 0 x 2 (t)dt = +1: So, in this case we have that x 1 (t)=x 2 (t) ! 0 and x 2 (t)=x 3 (t) ! 0 which clearly implies x 1 (t) ! 0; and
Proving our general theorem requires going through a number of similar steps, using Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, to show that the order in a sequence of IEWDS that satis…es properties (a) to (c) matches the order of the speed of evolutionary elimination in the sense that x s k (t)=x d k (t) ! 0; with the only possible exception to this rule being when
converges to a real number (possibly 0).
Four Lemmata
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on four lemmata that we prove in this subsection.
Lemma 1 If the growth-rate functions are Lipschitz continuous, and the dynamic is regular payo¤ monotonic, then there is a constant such that
j (x)) for all i; j and all x 2 such that i (x) j (x).
Proof. We prove the lemma by …nding a constant (i; j) for an arbitrary pair i and j: The desired result then follows from taking the smallest of these constants for all combinations of strategies i and j: If x 2 is such that i (x) = j (x); then regular payo¤ monotonicity implies g i (x) = g j (x) so we do not have to be concerned about such x: So, let x 2 be such that i (x) j (x) > 0. Suppose …rst that i (y) j (y) > 0 for all y 2 . Then, by continuity of the growth rate and payo¤ functions, we can de…ne (i; j) > 0 by
Suppose instead that i (y) j (y) 0 for some y 2 : Let S + = fs 2 S : u(i; s) > u(j; s)g and S = SnS + = fs 2 S : u(i; s) u(j; s)g: The set S + is not empty since
Similarly, the set S is not empty since i (y) j (y) 0 for some y 2 : Let x 0 2 be such x 0 s x s for s 2 S + ; x 0 s x s for s 2 S ; and
That is, x 0 is constructed from x by decreasing the fractions for s 2 S + and increasing the fraction for s 2 S until i (x 0 ) = j (x 0 ): Note that for the 1-norm, kx
By Lipschitz continuity there is a constant C > 0 such that
Let c = min s2S + (u(i; s) u(j; s)) > 0: Since x 0 is such that (x s x 0 s ) (u(i; s) u(j; s)) 0 for all s;
Together, (2) and (3) imply
Lemma 2 Assume that growth-rate functions are Lipschitz continuous, and that the dynamic is regular payo¤ monotonic. Consider a trajectory x. Suppose that s; d 2 S and T 2 R + are such that there are integrable functions a(t) : R + ! R + and b(t) :
for all t > T: Then x s (t)=x d (t) converges to a real number which is 0 if R 1 t=0 a(t)dt = +1:
Proof of Lemma 2. It follows from our assumption of regular monotonicity and Lemma 1 that there are constants and such that
for all t > T: Together (4) and (5) 
for all t > T: Therefore, since
the desired result follows.
Lemma 3 Assume that growth-rate functions are Lipschitz continuous, and that the dynamic is regular payo¤ monotonic. Consider a trajectory x. If d; j; s 2 S are such that (i) u(d; j) > u(s; j), and (ii) x i (t)=x j (t) ! 0 for all i such that u(d; i) < u(s; i) and
converges to a real number. If we also have that
This lemma says that if (i) strategy d performs strictly better than strategy s against strategy j, (ii) all strategies against which s is a better reply than d, and which remain in the population for a long time, eventually become in…nitely less frequent than strategy j, and (iii) strategy j remains in the population for a long time, then strategy s eventually becomes in…nitely less frequent than strategy d. If (iii) does not hold then the ratio of strategy s to strategy d may converge to a positive number.
10
Proof of Lemma 3. Let S 0 be the set of strategies i 6 = j such that
Since x i (t)=x j (t) ! 0 holds for all i 2 S 1 with u(d; i) < u(s; i); there is a T such that c(t) > 0 for all t > T: Therefore Lemma 2 applies and yields the desired conclusion.
Lemma 4 Assume that growth-rate functions are Lipschitz continuous, and that the dynamic is regular payo¤ monotonic. Consider a trajectory x. If s; d 2 S are such and 10 To make the intuition more transparent one may think of Lemma 3 as follows: (i) states that strategy j is "prey" for d.
(ii) states that all of the prey for s (d's "competitor") that survive long enough is in…nitely less frequent than j. (iii) states that d's prey survives long enough. Hence, eventually d becomes in…nitely more frequent than s.
Lemma 4 says that if (i) strategy d performs strictly better than strategy s against strategy s, (ii) strategy d remains in the population for a long time, and (iii) all strategies against which s is a better reply than d eventually become in…nitely less frequent than strategy d, then strategy s eventually becomes in…nitely less frequent than strategy d.
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Claim 1 Let z : R + ! R be di¤erentiable. Assume that there exists > 0 and T > 0 such that for any t T; _ z(t) < 0 whenever z(t) = : Then either z(t) > for all t T or there exists T 0 T such that z(t) for all t T 0 :
Proof of Claim 1. If z(s) for some s T then we can set T 0 = minft 2 R + :
Proof of Lemma 4. Let > 0 be given. To prove Lemma 4 it is su¢ cient to show that x s (t)=x d (t) < for all su¢ ciently large t: Under the assumptions of Lemma 4, there exists positive constants c 1 ; c 2 ; depending on the payo¤ function, such that
Since x i (t)=x d (t) ! 0 for all i with u(d; i) < u(s; i) there is some T such that the sum in (6) is smaller than c 1 =(2c 2 ) for all t T: Thus
for all t T: Let z(t) = x s (t)=x d (t): For any t T; if z(t) = ; then d (x(t)) s (x(t)) > 0; and hence by monotonicity _ z(t) < 0: By Claim 1 it follows that either (a) z(t) > for all t T ; or (b) there exists T 0 such that z(t) for all t T 0 : If (b) holds then we are done by de…nition of z: If (a) holds, then
for all t T and Lemma 2 applies with a(t) = c 1 x d (t)=2 and b(t) = 0 implying x s (t)=x d (t) ! 0: 
Induction Base
We want to show that
Set s 1 = 1 and
Since d 1 eliminates 1 in the IEWDS we know by (b), pairwise weak dominance, that s 1 > 0 or
Suppose s 1 > 0: Then we can apply Lemma 3 with j = s 1 , s = s 1 , and d = d 1 . (Note that part (ii) of the lemma is satis…ed by weak dominance.) If
and if r > 0; then we cannot have (By weak dominance part (ii) of the lemma is satis…ed.) If
We have now examined all possibilities to show that Property 0 or Property 1 holds for s = s 1 = 1:
Set s 2 = s 1 + 1 and assume that s 2 < d 1 : x d 1 (t)dt < +1 and thus we do not have to be concerned about the sign of u(s 2 ; s 1 ) u(d 1 ; s 1 ) when we apply Lemma 3. If s 2 > 0; then Lemma 3 applies with j = s 2 ; and if s 2 > 0 then Lemma 3 applies with j = d 1 : In both cases the implied result is that x s 2 (t)=x d 1 (t) converges to a real number which in turn, since
; by the comparison test for improper integrals implies that R 1 0 x s 2 (t)dt < +1: So, Property 0 holds for s = s 2 if it holds for s = s 1 : Suppose instead that Property 1 holds for s = s 1 : Then
then we can apply Lemma 3 with j = d 1 to derive the same result. So, Property 1 holds for s = s 2 if it holds for s = s 1 :
Set s 3 = s 2 + 1; and assume that s 3 < d 1 : Then we can repeat the same arguments since we now know that either Property 0 holds for s < s 3 or Property 1 holds for s < s 3 : We can continue using the same argument until we reach s = d 1 1.
Induction Step
Suppose that for allk = 1; : : : ; k;
To see that this is true suppose …rst that Property A0 is satis…ed fork = k. Then R 1 0 x s (t)dt < +1 for all s d k and we may employ the same argument as in the proof of the induction base to show that Property B0 or B1 is satis…ed since strategies s d k will not matter when we apply Lemma 3.
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If Property A0 is not satis…ed fork = k; then Property A1 is satis…ed fork = k and thus
We …rst wish to show that
Our sequence of IEWDS is such that d k+1 is the strategy that eliminates d k and thus
13 There will be two cases to check. One where
; in which case Property B0 will be satis…ed; and one where
in which case Property B1 will be satis…ed.
Consider s = d k 1 (which is eliminated by d k ) and examine the ratio
Furthermore, by (c), local strict transitivity, the inequality u(d k+1 ; i) u(d k 1; i) is strict at i = d k : Therefore Lemma 3 applies and yields
Now consider s = d k 2 and assume d k 2 is eliminated by d k and not by d k 1:
and, by local strict transitivity, at least one of these inequalities is strict at i = d k , and so u(
By repeating the argument we can conclude that x s (t)=x s k+1 (t) ! 0 for all s with
Recall that u(
. It therefore follows from (7) and Lemma 3 that x d k (t)=x d k+1 (t) converges to a real number. Since
it follows from the comparison test for improper integrals that R 1 0 x d k+1 (t)dt = +1 and so, by part (iii) of Lemma 3, the real number that x d k (t)=x d k+1 (t) converges to is 0:
We have shown that
Set (8) and Lemma 4 yield
We can repeat this step for s = s k + 1; s k + 2; : : : ; s k+1 1; and so x s (t)=x d k+1 (t) ! 0 for all such s. We have thus shown that Property B1 is satis…ed if Property A1 is satis…ed fork = k; and this completes the proof of the induction step.
Applications
We go through two applications, discretised versions of Bertrand duopoly and a twoplayer …rst-price auction, which are both such that it is straightforward to construct a sequence of IEWDS that satis…es the conditions of Theorem 1 and that eliminates all but one strategy. Thus our main result implies that a regular payo¤ monotonic dynamic selects this strategy, which approaches the Nash equilibrium strategy as the grid is made …ner.
Bertrand Duopoly
Consider the following discretised Bertrand duopoly. Let 1=M be the smallest monetary unit. Firm i sets price p i 2 0; eliminating 0: Then only strategy 1=M remains and thus this strategy is selected by evolution. By increasing M evolution selects a strategy pro…le that is arbitrarily close to 0.
Two-Player First-Price Auction with Common Values
The structure of a discretised …rst-price common-value auction with two players is similar to that of a discretised Bertrand duopoly. Let 1=M be the smallest monetary unit. Buyer i places a bid p i 2 0; 
To the best of our knowledge we are the …rst to provide general conditions under which a large class of imitative dynamics select against iteratively weakly dominated strategies. If a sequence of IEWDS satis…es our su¢ cient conditions, then, starting from any interior initial state, the strategies that are eliminated by that sequence become extinct asymptotically. Our results are proved for the class of regular payo¤ monotonic dynamics, which includes convex monotonic and aggregate monotonic dynamics such as the replicator dynamic. A potential shortcoming of our result is that it is not readily applicable to extensive form games, which is an important context in which weakly dominated strategies occur naturally. We note that Cressman (2003) provides some reason to be sceptical about the prospects of …nding general conditions for evolutionary selection of iteratively weakly dominated strategies in extensive form games. It should also be pointed out that although our condition ensures that, starting from any interior initial state, strategies that fail iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies become extinct asymptotically, our condition does not imply that the set of strategies that survive iterated weak dominance is Lyapunov stable. See Sandholm (2015) , page 752, for a counterexample.
It is well known that reinforcement learning (Arthur 1993 , Cross 1973 , Erev and Roth 1998 is closely linked with the replicator dynamic in the sense that the latter can be obtained as the mean …eld approximation of the former, as established by Börgers and Sarin (1997) and Hopkins (2002) . In light of this it would be interesting to test whether the convergence results of this paper are borne out in learning environments conducive to reinforcement learning, such as environments where subjects have no knowledge of the game they play and only receive feedback information about their own payo¤s (as in Nax et al. 2016) . We leave for future work the testing of our theorems in information settings conducive to learning heuristics that induce the replicator dynamic.
(a) Monotonicity
In section 3.2.3 we claimed that for G 7 and under any monotonic dynamic x 1 (t) ! 0 and x 3 (t) ! 0 if x 1 (0) x 3 (0). Since strategy 4 is identical to strategy 2, and since all strategies earn 0 against strategy 4, this follows from what we have already proven for game G 6 .
Regular Monotonicity
Our goal is to de…ne a monotonic dynamic and …nd an interior initial condition x(0) such that x 3 (t) ! 1 for the game G 8 , introduced in section 3.2.4. Let the strategies be named 1, 2, 3, and 4 according to row order. Write s 1 (x) for the strategy that has the highest payo¤ at the population state x; and s 2 (x) for the strategy that has the second highest payo¤ and so on. When two or more strategies have the same payo¤ at a population state
x then the ties can be broken arbitrarily, for example by giving priority to the strategy whose name is the lower number. To simplify the notation we write s i instead of s i (x) and de…ne growth rate functions by setting
for some positive integer n: For n = 1 we get the replicator dynamic since then g s i (x) = s i (x) (x). The growth rate functions de…ned by (9) are well de…ned for all positive integers k in the sense that P i g s i (x)x s i = 0. 16 They are also Lipschitz continuous because each g si is a degree n polynomial of payo¤ di¤erences with x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 as coe¢ cients, and if there is a point x which is a boundary point of both the set of x with s i (x) = j and the set of x with s i (x) = k; then j (x ) = k (x ) and g j (x ) = g k (x ): They are also monotonic since g s 1 (x) g s 2 (x) g s 3 (x) g s 4 (x), with strict inequality wherever payo¤s are not equal. However, for n > 1; regular monotonicity is violated if there exists x 2 such that s 2 (x ) = s 3 (x ), and for every > 0 there is an x 2 with kx xk < such that s 2 (x) 6 = s 3 (x). To see this, note that for any sequence x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : from that converges to x , with s 3 (x t )(x t ) 6 = s 3 (x t )(x t ) for all t, we have g s 2 (x t ) (x t ) g s 3 (x t ) (x t ) s 2 (x t ) (x t ) s 3 (x t ) (x t ) = ( s 2 (x t ) (x t ) s 3 (x t ) (x t )) n 1 ! 0
16 To see this note that P i g si (x)x si = g si (x) ( s1 (x) s2 (x))(x s2 +x s3 +x s4 ) ( s2 (x) s3 (x)) n (x s3 + x s4 ) ( s3 (x) s4 (x)) x s4 as t ! 1 if n > 1: For the game G 8 regular monotonicity is violated in a neighborhood of x = (0; 0; 1; 0) if n > 1 and we can use for example the sequence x t = 1 10t (3; 2; 10t 6; 1) to show it.
From now on, assume that n = 2: For G 8 ; consider the subset X of where x 1 x 2 3x 4 and x 3 3=4: For all x 2 X we have that s 1 (x) = 3; s 2 (x) = 2; s 3 (x) = 1; s 4 (x) = 4; and, importantly, the only way for a solution to our di¤erential equations to leave X is for x 2 (t) to outgrow x 1 (t): Setting s 1 (x) = 3; s 2 (x) = 2; s 3 (x) = 1; s 4 (x) = 4 yields g 2 (x) = ( s 1 (x) s 2 (x))( x s 1 ) + ( s 2 (x) s 3 (x)) 2 (x s 3 + x s 4 ) + ( s 3 (x) s 4 (x)) x s 4 = (2x 1 + x 2 x 4 )( x 3 ) + x 2 2 (x 1 + x 4 ) + (2x 1 2x 2 )x 4 : Since x 1 x 2 3x 4 and x 3 3=4 for x 2 X we can put a simple upper bound on g 2 (x) for x 2 X: g 2 (x) = (2x 1 + x 2 x 4 )( x 3 ) + x 2 2 (x 1 + x 4 ) + (2x 1 2x 2 )x 4 < 3(2x 1 + x 2 x 4 )=4 + x 2 2 (x 1 + x 4 ) + (2x 1 2x 2 )x 4 = x 2 =2 (x 2 =4 3x 4 =4) x 1 (6=4 x 2 2 2x 4 ) x 4 (2x 2 x 2 2 ) < x 2 =2:
It follows that _ x 2 (t) = g 2 (x(t))x 2 (t) x 2 (t) 2 =2.
The di¤erential equation _ z(t) = z(t) 2 =2 is separable and has the solution z(t) = 2=(t + 2=z(0)): Since _ x 2 (t) _ z(t) whenever x 2 (t) z(t); we can conclude that if z(0) = x 2 (0); then x 2 (t) z(t) for all t; which implies So, for solution mappings that never leave X we have established an upper bound for R 1 0 x 2 2 (t)dt that depends on x 2 (0): Because of how our growth rate functions are de…ned with n = 2 we can use this to establish an upper bound for x 2 (t)=x 1 (t): Pick any x(0) 2 X such that x 2 (0) = 1=100 and x 1 (0) = e 2 =100. 17 Then, for all T such that x(t) 2 X for all t T; ln x 2 (T ) x 1 (T ) = Z T 0 (g 2 (x(t)) g 1 (x(t)))dt + ln x 2 (0)
2x 2 (0) + ln x 2 (0) x 1 (0) = 2 100 2 ln e < 1:
It follows that x 2 (T )=x 1 (T ) e 1 for all such T: Since x 2 (t)=x 1 (t) changes continuously with time, it follows that x 2 (t) < x 1 (t) for all t 0 and thus x(t) 2 X for all t 0: Since the solution mapping never leaves X; strategy 3 grows forever and strategies 1; 2; 4 decrease forever. To rule out that x 1 ; x 2 ; x 4 converge to something other than 0 we can look at g 3 (x) g 1 (x) which satis…es g 3 (x(t)) g 1 (x(t))
x 1 (t) for x 2 X: Hence, if x 1 (t) converged to something other than 0; then x 1 (t)=x 3 (t) would converge to 0; which contradicts that x 1 (t) converges to something other than 0: Thus x 1 (t) ! 0, and since x 1 x 2 x 4 for x 2 X it follows that x 2 (t) and x 3 (t) converge to 0 as well. The reason that this happens for n = 2 is that for n = 2; R 1 0 (g 2 (x(t)) g 1 (x(t)))dt can be …nite even if R 1 0 x 2 (t)dt is in…nite. 18 For n = 1; i.e., for the replicator dynamic, this is not possible. 18 We did not prove that R 1 0 x 2 (t)dt is in…nite for the x(0) 2 X we picked but it is since g 2 (x(t)) > (2x 1 (t) + x 2 (t)) > (2e 2 + 1)x 2 (t) for all t:
